Vote record

tx 84be50af0ac7e2e43e6cd76dcea4bd6a0e5cfcdb1abd65c6e76e54b850734488

One transaction — 3 vote certificates

YES

Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713)

Epoche641

Cast2026-07-04

Requested—

OutcomeDROPPED

By this Info action, the DReps agree a new Net Change Limit of 500,000,000 ada (500,000,000,000,000 lovelace) for the Cardano Treasury, for the period beginning at the start of Epoch 613 (February 13, 2026) and ending at the close of Epoch 713 (on or about July 3, 2027). This Net Change Limit is a fixed cap on the total ada removed from the Treasury through Treasury Withdrawals during the period; it does not count Treasury inflows. This is a newly agreed Net Change Limit: it is the applicable Net Change Limit for the period and supersedes any prior Net Change Limit for the same period. Because the period begins at the start of Epoch 613, all Treasury Withdrawals already debited during the period count toward this 500,000,000 ada limit. This Info action records the DReps' agreement to this Net Change Limit when Yes votes exceed 50% of the active voting stake, the threshold TREASURY-01a sets for agreeing a Net Change Limit; it has no direct on-chain effect and does not authorize any Treasury Withdrawal.

Reasoning

Written after the vote was cast

What this asks for, and from whom

An Info Action setting the Net Change Limit at 500,000,000 ADA for epochs 613 to 713, a fixed cap on total treasury outflows for that window.

What would have to be true for this to be a good use of treasury funds

The NCL is the ceiling that makes everything else disciplined. Without a hard cap, every budget conversation becomes unbounded. A number has to exist, and it has to be enforced.

What specifically concerns me

500 million is not small, and I voted yes on a competing 300 million version earlier at epoch 617 because I lean toward the tighter cap. My position is not that a big number is automatically wrong, it is that the cap only means something if we then hold the line on individual proposals. The limit does not spend the money. Dreps do.

What I am asking of the proposer if this passes

It expired. Either way my position stands: set the cap, publish outflows against it continuously, and let the community watch the meter run. A limit nobody can track is not a limit.

Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment

Epoche641

Cast2026-07-04

Requested9.0M ₳

OutcomeDROPPED

# Strike Finance V2 Treasury Deployment Proposal This governance action requests a **12-month productive treasury deployment of 9,000,000 ADA** into Strike Finance V2 liquidity infrastructure. This is **not grant funding**. Treasury-owned capital would be deployed to deepen Cardano-native perpetual futures liquidity, increase on-chain trading activity, and generate yield for the Cardano Treasury. Strike has processed **over 1,130,000,000 USD** in cumulative volume, facilitated **968,000+ trades** across **3,071 unique traders**, generated **over 3,250,000 USD** in profit for liquidity providers, produced **over 1,160,000 USD** in total protocol revenue, and represented **over 50% of Cardano trading activity** during the past six months. | Allocation | Amount | Purpose | |---|---:|---| | V2 USDM liquidity | 9,000,000 ADA sold for USDM | Support scalable execution depth and stablecoin markets | The deployed ADA will be **sold for USDM**, Cardano's fiat-backed stablecoin, to provide stablecoin-denominated liquidity. For modeling, this proposal assumes **ADA = 0.15 USD**, making **9,000,000 ADA** approximately **1,350,000 USDM** of stablecoin liquidity. The actual USDM notional will depend on the conversion price at deployment and will be transparently reported. Under conservative modeled assumptions, the deployment is expected to generate approximately **900,000 ADA-equivalent** in annual yield. Assuming no ADA price change, this would increase the treasury-owned position from **9,000,000 ADA** to approximately **9,900,000 ADA-equivalent** over 12 months. These are modeled estimates, not guaranteed returns. **A council composed of Rami from Snek, Phil from Surf, and James from Moneta will serve as the administrator for this proposal.** Operational custody of deployed liquidity will be handled through this independent multisig council. Strike Finance will not have unilateral custody or control of treasury assets. Realized yield from the first six months will be returned to the Cardano Treasury at month 6. At month 12, **100% of treasury-owned deployed assets, including remaining principal and realized yield, will be returned to the Cardano Treasury**. Any further treasury participation would require a new governance proposal.

Reasoning

Written after the vote was cast

What this asks for, and from whom

Strike Finance asked for a 12-month deployment of 9,000,000 ADA of treasury-owned capital into their V2 perpetual futures liquidity infrastructure. Framed explicitly as a deployment rather than a grant, with yield returning to the treasury. They cite over 1.13 billion USD cumulative volume and 968,000+ trades.

What would have to be true for this to be a good use of treasury funds

I would have to believe the community treasury belongs in a leveraged derivatives liquidity position. The traction numbers are real and I want to say that plainly, because Strike has built something people actually use, which is more than most proposals can claim.

What specifically concerns me

The treasury as market maker. This is the same line I drew on the Alchemy proposal and I am drawing it in the same place here. Deploying community funds as launch liquidity into perpetual futures is not funding infrastructure, it is taking a market position with money that belongs to everyone. Yield flows back if it works. The community eats it if it does not. Strike has the traction to raise this capital privately, and a business with 1.13 billion in volume should be able to.

What I am asking of the proposer if this passes

It was dropped. If Strike returns: raise the liquidity privately and bring the treasury a proposal for what is genuinely public, open contracts, integration standards, audits. I would read that with real interest.

Cardano Builder DAO

Epoche641

Cast2026-07-04

Requested20.0M ₳

OutcomeDROPPED

The Cardano Builder DAO is an ecosystem-wide, purpose-built, smart contract-governed funding mechanism to support projects advancing Cardano’s Vision 2030 through measurable ecosystem KPIs. Its role is to allocate capital to builders who can drive growth in the metrics that matter most to Cardano’s long-term success, including monthly active users, monthly on-chain transactions, and TVL.

Reasoning

Written after the vote was cast

What this asks for, and from whom

The Cardano Builder DAO asked for 20,000,000 ADA to run a smart-contract-governed funding mechanism allocating capital to builders against Vision 2030 KPIs: monthly active users, on-chain transactions, TVL.

What would have to be true for this to be a good use of treasury funds

The first round would have to have worked. I voted YES on Cardano Builder DAO at 12,000,000 ADA back in epoch 571, through the first Intersect budget process. So this is not a stranger asking. This is a repeat ask, nearly double the size, and the standard for a repeat ask is simple: show me what the first 12 million produced.

What specifically concerns me

I could not point to the KPI movement that would justify going from 12 million to 20 million. Let's be real about it: a funding mechanism that allocates capital to other builders is a layer of overhead between the treasury and the actual work. That layer has to earn its existence with results, not with a restated mission. Putting new money after money that has not yet proven itself is how treasuries bleed out. I am not opposed to the model. I am opposed to scaling it before it is proven.

What I am asking of the proposer if this passes

It was dropped. If it comes back: publish what the first 12 million funded, which projects survived, and what happened to MAU, transactions, and TVL as a result. Real numbers, not a portfolio slide. That version gets a fair read from me.