Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program
Cardano's infrastructure depends on open source software maintained by a handful of individuals with no formal support, succession planning, or continuity funding. Research shows 96% of commercial codebases contain OSS with fewer than 10 contributors. Critical protocol libraries, wallet SDKs, developer tooling, and indexing infrastructure have single maintainers, no succession plans, and no stable funding beyond episodic grants. This program establishes a community-governed, data-driven open source sustainment architecture. Funded through direct treasury withdrawal, operated by an independent entity, and overseen by two advisory councils — an External Open Source Advisory Council and a Technical Community Advisory Council. Four programs: (1) a Maintenance Fund providing long-term retainer funding for the highest-risk infrastructure, selected by dependency data; (2) a Maintainer Development program building structured mentor–mentee pipelines; (3) a CodeForUs bounty program for targeted delivery work; and (4) an Ecosystem Activation Reserve funding contributor entry programs. Selection follows published dependency centrality data, not relationships. Reporting is public and quarterly. All programs carry explicit sunset criteria. The operator is replaceable by community governance. Total: 12,000,000 ADA over 36 months.
Reasoning
Written after the vote was cast
What this asks for, and from whom
The Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program asked for 12,000,000 ADA to establish a community-governed open source sustainment program, citing research that 96 percent of commercial codebases depend on OSS maintained by fewer than 10 contributors.
What would have to be true for this to be a good use of treasury funds
The problem is real and the citations are right. Critical protocol libraries and tooling do run on single maintainers with no succession plan. I voted yes on many individual maintenance grants precisely because I believe this.
What specifically concerns me
The structure and the size. Twelve million ADA to create a new funding body that then distributes to maintainers puts an administrative layer between the treasury and the actual maintainers, and we already fund open source maintenance directly through the budget process. I voted no again on the revised 4,094,000 version at epoch 644 for the same core reason: the entity gets built after the money arrives rather than before.
What I am asking of the proposer if this passes
It was dropped. The mission deserves to exist. Form the entity first, publish the charter, name the councils, and show precisely which maintainers fall through the gaps of the programs we already pay for. That proposal I would take seriously.